|
|
Two (2) Indian law cases have been decided
by the Supreme Court in the 2001-2002 term.
Chickasaw
Nation v. United States
534
U.S. 84
Docket
No. 00-507
Subjects: Gaming - Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act (IGRA) (25
USC 2701 et seq.); Taxation - Federal
*Issue: Under applicable Indian-law canons
of statutory construction, does IGRA, by 25
U.S.C 2719(d)(1)'s express incorporation of Chapter 35 of Internal
Revenue Code, confer on Indian tribes conducting gaming operations
same exemption from wagering taxes afforded to states by Chapter
35 of IRC?
Holding: (from Westlaw) The Supreme
Court, Justice Breyer, held that Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)
did not exempt Tribes from paying those gambling-related excise
and occupational taxes that States were not required to pay under
Internal Revenue Code chapter 35.
Affirmed.
History: Petition for certiorari filed 10/03/00. Certiorari
granted 1/22/01. Case argued 10/02/01. Case decided 11/27/01.
Motion for petitioner to dispense with printing the joint appendix
granted 3/19/01.
*Holding: The US Supreme Court held that section 2719(d)(1)
does not exempt tribes from paying the gambling-related taxes that
chapter 35 imposes. Holding Below: Chickasaw
Nation v. United States , 208
F.3d 871 10th Cir., 4/5/00. Court of Appeals
held that pull-tab games are considered "lottery" and so are a taxable
"wager;" the Chickasaw Nation was considered a "person" and so subject
to taxes; the IGRA did not preclude the imposition of federal wagering
excise taxes; and finally, the self-government guarantee of the 1855
treaty between the US and Chickasaw Nation did not preclude the imposition
of taxes in question. Second Holding Below: Choctaw
Nation of Oklahoma v. United States, 210
F.3d 389. Using same reasoning as companion appeal of Chickasaw
Nation, the appeals court determined that the IGRA does not preclude
imposition of federal wagering excise taxes on wagers placed on Indian
pull-tab games operated by tribe under IGRA on trust lands.
United States v. Little Six Inc.
534
U.S. 1052
Docket
No. 00-1115
*Issue:
Does Section 20(d) of IGRA, 25
U.S.C. 2719(d) , exempt Native American tribes from wagering
excise and occupational taxes imposed by Sections 4401 and 4411 of
IRC?
Subjects:
Gaming, Taxation
History:
Petition for certiorari filed 1/10/01. Judgment vacated 12/03/01.
*Holding:
The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the US Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for further consideration in light
of Chickasaw
Nation v. United States. Holding Below: Little
Six, Inc. and Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux (Dakota) Community v. United
States 210
F.3d 1361 Fed. Cir. Court held that although tribal
revenues from wagers placed on "pull-tab" games operated on Indian
reservations are subject to federal excise tax and related occupational
tax under Sections 4401 and 4411 of Internal Revenue Code, tribes
are nevertheless exempt from such taxes under provision of Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, 25
U.S.C. 2719(d)(1), ambiguous language of which can reasonably
be construed to exempt Indian pull-tab games from federal wagering
taxes and therefore must, under Indian canon of construction, be construed
in tribe's favor.
Back to Top
Petition for Certiorari was granted in two
(2) Indian law cases
United States v. Navajo Nation, Docket No.
01-1375
Oral
Argument Transcripts
Subjects:
Mineral Rights - Indian Mineral Leasing Act (25
USC 396a et seq.); Mineral Rights - Claims Against the United
States; Mineral Rights - Leasing
*Issues:
Did court of appeals properly hold that United States
is liable to Navajo Nation for up to $600 million in damages for
breach of fiduciary duty in connection with secretary's actions
concerning Indian mineral lease, without finding that secretary
had violated any specific statutory or regulatory duty established
pursuant to Indian Mineral Leasing Act?
History:
Petition for certiorari filed 3/15/02. Petition granted
6/03/02. Current
US Supreme Court docket information.
Supreme Court Pleadings: Petition
for writ of certiorari.
*Holding
below: Navajo
Nation v. United States. Fed. Cir., 263
F. 3d. 1325. By suppressing deputy assistant secretary
for Indian affairs' decision to increase royalty rate on Indian
coal lease to reasonable level after meeting secretly with lessee
and adopting lessee's position, secretary of interior acted in
direct contravention of Indian Mineral Leasing Act's charge to
obtain for Indians maximum return for their minerals and breached
government's fiduciary duty, action that was within jurisdiction
of Court of Federal Claims and subject to remedy by assessment
of damages resulting from breach of trust.
United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, Docket No. 01-1067
Oral
Argument Transcripts
Subject:
Trust relation - Breach
*
Issue: Does Pub. L. No. 86-392 (1960) authorize award of money
damages against United States for alleged breach of trust in connection
with described property?
History:
Petition for certiorari filed 1/22/02. Petition for certiorari
granted 4/22/02. Current
US Supreme Court docket information
Supreme Court Pleadings: Petition
of US
Reply brief for the petitioner.
*Holding
Below: White
Mountain Apache v. United States Fed. Cir., 249
F.3d. 1364, Pub. L. No. 86-392 (1960), which provided that
Fort Apache military post shall be "held by the United States in trust
for the White Mountain Apache Tribe, subject to the right of the Secretary
of the Interior to use any part of the land and improvements for administrative
or school purposes for as long as they are needed for that purpose,"
created enforceable fiduciary relationship between United States and
tribe with respect to buildings over which United States exercised
control to exclusion of tribe, breach of which gives rise to cognizable
claim for money damages.
Back to Top
Petition
for certiorari was denied in the following twenty-five (25)
Indian law cases.
Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Young, Docket
No. 01-1786
Subjects:
Sovereign Immunity - Tribal; Employment; Business and Economic
Development - Contracts; Statutes - State
*Issues: (1) Did tribe waive its sovereign immunity such
that it can be held liable for alleged breach of employment
agreement--even though it was never party to agreement--based
on state law doctrines extending liability to noncontractual
parties? (2) Did tribe waive its sovereign immunity for purpose
of subjecting itself to Michigan's judgment interest statute
even though it never expressly agreed to subject itself to statute?
(3) In actions against sovereign Indian tribes, can state courts
vitiate federal law governing waivers of sovereign immunity,
which requires such waivers to be express and unequivocal, by
applying state law doctrines or statutes?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 6/3/02. Current
US Supreme Court docket information.
*Holding
below: Young v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians,
Mich. (unreported) App. 2001
WL 672070. Plain language of joint venture master
agreement, which was signed by tribe, demonstrates that parties
thereto intended that such agreement and other documents "executed
and delivered at [c]losing," including employment agreement,
be construed as one agreement, and thus (i) breach of employment
agreement constitutes breach of joint venture master agreement,
which explicitly waives tribe's sovereign immunity from suit
to enforce that agreement and all agreements executed and delivered
at closing, (ii) claim of breach was subject to arbitration
under terms of joint venture master agreement, and (iii) tribe
could be held liable for such breach; award of statutory interest
from date arbitration award was issued through date judgment
entered on award is satisfied is statutorily required by state
law, despite tribe's contention that its waiver of sovereign
immunity, even if it applies to claims of breach of employment
agreement, does not apply to awards of postaward and postjudgment
statutory interest.
Dawavendewa
v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District,
Docket No. 01-1762
Subjects: Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District; Indian preference in hiring -- Navajo Nation, Arizona, New Mexico & Utah -- Members; Hopi
Indians; Independent contractors -- On Indian reservations -- Navajo
Nation, Arizona, New Mexico & Utah; Sovereign immunity -- Tribes -- United States; Tribal self-determination -- United States; United States. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act; United States. Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title 7; Discrimination in employment; Sovereign immunity -- Tribes -- Officials and
employees.
*Issues:
(1) Does tribal sovereign immunity render Title VII of 1964
Civil Rights Act impotent in claims between non-member employee
and nonmember employer engaged in business on reservation
when tribe has passed legislation mandating discriminatory
employment practices? (2) Can tribal officials be sued as
indispensable and necessary parties for purpose of prospective
relief in situations in which tribal nations pass and enforce
legislation that conflicts with federal law regarding employment
and exceeds scope of tribe's sovereign powers?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 5/30/02. Current
US Supreme Court docket information.
*Holding
below: Dawavendewa
v. Salt River Agr. Imp. and Power District, Ninth Cir.,
276
F.3d. 1150. In Hopi plaintiff's suit against lessee
of Navajo Nation challenging lessee's enforcement of lease
provision giving employment preference to members of Nation,
Nation is necessary party because plaintiff cannot be accorded
complete relief in Nation's absence, suit threatens to impair
Nation's contractual interests, and any disposition of suit
in Nation's absence threatens to leave lessee subject to substantial
risks of incurring multiple or inconsistent obligations, but
Nation cannot be joined because it has not waived its tribal
sovereign immunity and Congress has not clearly abrogated
tribal sovereign immunity in cases under Title VII of 1964
Civil Rights Act; plaintiff's suit was against lessee only,
he specified no action by tribal officials performed in contravention
of constitutional or federal statutory law, relief he seeks
would operate against Nation as signatory to lease, and thus
plaintiff may not circumvent Nation's sovereign immunity by
joining tribal officials in its stead; both Nation and lessee
could incur prejudice if decision were rendered in Nation's
absence, no relief mitigates prejudice, no partial relief
is adequate, and plaintiff may have alternative forum available
via suit brought on his behalf by Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, and thus Nation is indispensable party whose absence
requires dismissal of suit without prejudice.
Bank One NA v. Shumake,Docket No. 01-1732
Subjects:
Tribal Courts - Jurisdiction; Civil Jurisdiction, Federal - Exhaustion
of Tribal Remedies
*
Issues: 1) Should prudential, judge-made "tribal exhaustion"
doctrine be expanded to displace statutory command of Federal
Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 4, which creates juridical remedy in federal
district court for enforcement of agreements to arbitrate? (2)
Does Indian tribal court jurisdiction extend to civil suits arising
out of alleged commercial relationships between members and nonmembers
of tribe, when such assertions of jurisdiction are not necessary
to protect tribal self-government or to control internal tribal
relations--question left open by this court in Nevada
v. Hicks, 533 US 353, 69 U.S.L.W. 4528 (2001)?
History: Petition for certiorari filed 5/22/02. Current
US Supreme Court Docket information.
*Holding
below: Bank
One, N.A. v. Shumake, 5th Cir., 281
F.3d 507, District court's dismissal of bank's suit
to compel arbitration of claims brought against it in tribal court
by members of Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians asserting that
bank financed satellite system purchases through use of bogus
credit cards and concealed material information with respect to
credit transactions is affirmed, district court having properly
determined that tribal exhaustion doctrine required giving tribal
court first opportunity to rule on question of its jurisdiction.
Ramapough
Mountain Indians v. Norton, Docket No. 01-1703
Subjects:
Tribes -- Federal Recognition of; Cultural Heritage --
History
*Issues:
Can Bureau of Indian Affairs deny tribal descent by dismissing
key pieces of evidence under conclusiveness standard, ignoring
reasonable inferences, and discounting each piece of evidence
in isolation without regard to cumulative weight of evidence?
History:
Petition for certiorari filed 5/16/02. Current
US Supreme Court Docket information.
*Holding
below: Ramapough Mountain Indians v. Norton, D.C. Cir., 25
Fed.Appx. 2. (Unpublished) Assistant secretary for
Indian Affairs reasonably concluded that group of people seeking
federal recognition as Indian tribe failed to comply with regulation
requiring it to show, as prerequisite for recognition, that its
membership consists of individuals who descend from historical
Indian tribe, documentation of such descent not having been offered
and other evidence being limited.
Ysleta
del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, Docket No. 01-1671
Subjects:
Gaming - Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) (25
USC 2701 et seq.); Tribal Sovereignty and Powers; State Rights;
Gambling - Law and Legislation.
*Issues:
(1) Does Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, instead of Pueblo's Restoration
Act, govern gaming activities on reservation lands of Ysleta del
Sur Pueblo? (2) If not, should gaming provisions of Pueblo's Restoration
Act be interpreted consistently with this court's decision in
California
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 US 202 (1987), thus
preventing grave miscarriage of justice?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed 5/13/02. Current
US Supreme Court Docket information.
*Holding
below: Unreported decision. Fifth Cir., 1/17/02. Summary judgment
in favor of Texas in its action to enjoin gambling on Indian reservation
and injunction directing Ysleta del Sur Pueblo to stop gambling
activities at Speaking Rock Casino are affirmed for reasons stated
by district court, namely that Pueblo's Restoration Act, which
prohibits Pueblo from engaging in gaming activity that would not
be permissible for ordinary citizen of Texas, precludes gaming
activities at Speaking Rock Casino, which violate Texas Penal
Code.
Tang v. Northern Cheyenne Tribe, Docket No. 01-1057
Subjects:
Tribal Courts - Jurisdiction; Civil Jurisdiction, Federal -
Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies; Tribal Courts - Appeal and Review
Issues:
None provided
History:
Petition for certiorari filed (in forma pauperis) 4/26/2001.
Current
US Supreme Court docket information.
*Holding
below: Tang v. Northern Cheyenne Tribe, Ninth Cir., (Unreported)
31
Fed.Appx. 438, The federal courts lack jurisdiction
to consider Tang's claims against the Northern Cheyenne Tribe
because Tang has not yet exhausted his remedies by appealing
tribal jurisdiction to the tribal appeals court. See Allstate
Indem. Co. v. Stump, 191 F.3d 1071, 1073 (9th Cir.), amended
by 197 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir.1999).
Kornwolf
v. United States, Docket No. 01-1534
Subjects:
Environmental Regulation - Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16
USC 703); Environmental Regulation - Bald Eagle Protection
Act (16
USC 668); Cultural Resources; Eagle Feathers
*Issues:
1) Is Andrus
v. Allard still good law despite its inconsistency with subsequent
opinions of this court, almost unanimous criticism of commentators,
and confusion it has promoted in lower courts? (2) Is it unconstitutional
taking of private property to impose criminal sanctions on sale
of innocuous, historically significant, antique Indian artifacts
containing golden eagle feathers when petitioner's ownership of
those artifacts predates statutory protection of golden eagle,
there is no evidence that ban on sale substantially advances protection
of golden eagle, and effect of ban is to destroy economic value
of artifacts?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 4/11/02. Current
US Supreme Court Docket information.
*Holding
Below: United
States v. Kornwolf, (PDF) Eighth Cir., 276
F.3d. 1014. Under Andrus
v. Allard, 444 US 51 (1979), provisions of Bald and Golden
Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act that ban sale
of eagle feathers do not create unconstitutional taking when applied
to sale of Indian artifacts containing eagle feathers that owner
had acquired prior to effective dates of statutes.
Linneen v. Gila River Indian Community, Docket No. 01-1462
Subjects:
Sovereignty - Tribal; Tribal Law Enforcement; Indian Country -
Jurisdiction; Liberty
*Issues:
Should tribal sovereign immunity be limited to extent necessary
to provide petitioners with opportunity and mechanism for seeking
redress for violation of their fundamental civil liberties?
History:
Petition for certiorari filed 3/1/02. Petition for certiorari
was denied 6/24/02.
*Holding
below: Linneen
v. Gila River Indian Community, (PDF), 9th. Cir., 276
F.3d 489
District court's dismissal, on grounds of tribal sovereign immunity,
of individuals' 42
U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against Native American community
and its officials, alleging that tribal ranger unlawfully detained
and threatened them while they were walking dogs on Indian land
is affirmed, alleged misconduct having occurred while ranger was
on official duty.
Wisconsin
v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al, Docket No. 01-1247
Subjects:
Environmental Regulation - Watersheds and Wetlands; Environmental
Regulation - Tribal Jurisdiction; Constitution, United States
- Equal Footing Doctrine; Environmental Regulation - State Law;
Environmental Regulation - Clean Water Act
*Issues:
(1) Can Indian tribe possess inherent authority to regulate
navigable waters within its reservation when, under equal footing
doctrine, state holds and exercises sovereignty over such waters
and submerged lands beneath them? (2) Does EPA's policy that Indian
tribes possess inherent authority to regulate navigable waters
within reservation, based on purely hypothetical concerns that
state and federal regulation may not adequately curtail water
pollution by nonmembers, contravene this court's precedents concerning
second exception under Montana
v. United States, 450 US 544 (1981), which require that tribe
demonstrate actual threat to self-governance before it may be
deemed to have inherent regulatory authority over nonmembers or
resources not held by tribe?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed 2/25/02. Petition denied
6/3/02.
*Holding
below: Wisconsin
v. E.P.A., Seventh Cir., 266
F.3d 741, Environmental Protection Agency's decision
under Section 518(e) of Clean Water Act to treat Indian tribe
as state for purposes of promulgating water quality standards,
based on agency's determination that tribe has inherent authority
over water within its reservation regardless of ownership, and
on tribe's showing that impairment of reservation waters would
affect tribe's political integrity, economic security, or health
or welfare, is not arbitrary or unreasonable interpretation of
statute or regulations, even though resulting authority may affect
off-reservation activities; even assuming for purposes of this
appeal that, pursuant to equal footing doctrine, state has title
to lakebeds within reservation, it was reasonable for EPA to determine
that ownership of lakebeds did not preclude federally approved
regulation by tribe of quality of water, and that determination
is upheld.
Missouri
River Services, Inc. v. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska, Docket No. 01-1149<
Subjects:
Gaming - Contracts; Jurisdiction
* Issues: (1) May court vacate arbitration award that satisfies
all criteria set forth in Federal Arbitration Act but (assertedly)
violates extra-statutory requirements imposed by court? (2) May
federal court to which arbitration award has been submitted for
confirmation independently determine question possessing jurisdictional
implications when jurisdictional question is inextricably intertwined
with merits of case and necessarily was resolved by arbitrator?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed 2/04/02. Petition was denied
5/13/02.
*Holding
below: Missouri
River Services, Inc., v. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska, (PDF) 8th
Cir., 267
F 3d. 848. Agreement under which Indian tribe gave
company exclusive right to build and operate gaming facility on
tribal land clearly restricted facility's location to Thurston
County, Nebraska, limited gaming in facility to bingo and bingo-related
activities, and provided that any monetary award against tribe
could be satisfied only out of such facility or tribe's share
of future net operating profits under agreement, and thus, in
arbitration proceeding brought by company seeking reimbursement
of its capital investment after facility failed, arbitrator's
award ordering payment to company from proceeds of tribe's other
gaming operation in Iowa, or from any other funds tribe may elect
to use, failed to draw its essence from agreement and therefore
must be strictly limited to profits of, and property purchased
for, Nebraska facility.
Warrior v. Boxx, Docket No. 01-1249
Subjects:
Tribal Courts - Jurisdiction; Civil Jurisdiction, Federal - Exhaustion
of Tribal Remedies
*Issues:
(1) Must tribal court defendant exhaust tribal remedies prior
to initiating challenge to tribal court jurisdiction in federal courts
when action arises out of private consensual relationship with tribal
member? (2) Does tribal court have jurisdiction over cause of action
between tribal member and non-Indian arising from private consensual
social relationship?
History:
Petition for certiorari filed 2/19/02. Denied 4/29/02 Current
US Supreme Court docket information
*Holding
below: Boxx
v. Warrior,(PDF) 9th Cir., 265
F. 3d. 771. Tribal court lacked jurisdiction over tribal
member's negligence action, arising from automobile accident on non-Indian
fee land within reservation, against non-Indian driver with whom member
had consensual social relationship, and thus non-Indian was not required
to exhaust tribal remedies before seeking federal court injunction
barring member from pursuing tribal court action.
Spirit Lake Tribe v. North Dakota, Docket No. 01-1185
Subjects:
Lands - Quiet Title; Lands - Contested and Disputed Lands; Division
of Indian Affairs - Officials and Employees
*Issues:
(1) When Congress claims federal ownership in trust and federal employee
asserts federal ownership in fee, is federal employee's assertion
federal "claim to land" for purposes of statute of limitations
contained in Quiet Title Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2409a(g)? (2) If federal employee's act does constitute
claim for purposes of Quiet Title Act, can federal associate solicitor
abandon federal employee's unlawful claim and reclaim land in trust?
(3) When district court grants defendant's motion for summary judgment
on jurisdictional issue and does not resolve disputed issues of fact,
does court of appeals have authority to resolve disputed issues of
fact against plaintiff?
History: Petition for certiorari filed 2/11/02. Petition denied
4/15/02. Current
US Supreme Court docket information
*Holding
below: Spirit
Lake Tribe v. State of North Dakota, (PDF), 8th Cir., 262
F.3d. 732. Indian tribe knew or should have known in 1971
when federal government received quitclaim deed from North Dakota
for portion of disputed lake that there was cloud over tribe's claim
that lake was part of reservation under 1867 treaty, and thus tribe's
1986 suit under Quiet Title Act asserting its interest in lake was
time barred by statute's 12-year limitations period; 1976 memorandum
authored by associate solicitor for Division of Indian Affairs within
department of interior stating that lake was wholly within reservation
did not abandon government's interest in lake because, among other
things, government cannot abandon property without congressional authorization;
even if associate solicitor had authority to bind government, he did
not act in manner that suggested he was establishing position for
government, and thus he did not abandon government's claim to lake;
district court's grant of summary judgment to government was improper,
because court lacked jurisdiction under Quiet Title Act to hear time-barred
case and thus should have dismissed government for lack of jurisdiction
rather than entering judgment in government's favor; district court
did not abuse its discretion by dismissing tribe's claims against
state and private landowners due to its inability to join federal
government, which was indispensable party.
Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas v. Comstock Oil &
Gas Inc., Docket No. 01-1101
Subjects:
Mineral Rights - Leasing; Mineral Rights - Indian Mineral Leasing
Act (25 USC
396a et seq.); Mineral Rights - Indian Mineral Development Act
(IMDA 2101-2108); Sovereign Immunity - Tribal; Sovereignty - Sovereign
Immunity - Tribal Officers; Ex parte Young (209 US 123 (1908))
*Issues: (1) Does tribe's sovereign immunity
from suit extend to actions for prospective equitable relief? (2)
Do tribal officials acting within lawful authority of their office
share tribe's immunity from suit in actions for prospective equitable
relief except as provided by doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 US
123 (1908)? (3) Does suit against tribal officials to declare in
full effect oil and gas leases subject to Indian Mineral Development
Act, or Indian Mineral Leasing Act, meet requirements of Ex parte
Young doctrine?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed 1/24/02. Certiorari was denied
4/1/02.
*Holding
below: Comstock
Oil & Gas v. Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes Fifth Cir.,
261
F. 3d. 567. Neither Indian
tribe nor tribal council members are entitled to sovereign immunity
in declaratory judgment action brought in federal court by oil companies
seeking to enforce oil and gas leases on tribe's reservation.
Bay
Mills Indian Community v. Michigan, Docket No. 01-1036
Subjects: Taxation - State; Trade and Intercourse Act - Lands
(25 USC 177);
Due Process; Equality Before the Law - United States; Lands - Trust
Relation
*Issues:
(1) In 1881, did Trade and Intercourse Act prevent Michigan from selling
Indian tribal land acquired by tribe in fee in 1857 for nonpayment
of property taxes? (2) Assuming that tribe had cause of action against
Michigan for taking of its tribal lands in tax sale, for denial of
due process and equal protection, must that action be brought only
under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, or does Constitution support action for violation
of its due process and equal protection clauses? (3) Does ruling in
Cass
County Minnesota v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 US
103, 66 U.S.L.W. 4453 (1998), bar plaintiff's action when plaintiff's
tribal land was taken by Michigan for nonpayment of real property
taxes in spite of fact that Congress never removed its trust status?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 1/14/02. Petition for certiorari
was denied 3/18/02.
Current
US Supreme Court docket information.
*Holding
below: Bay
Mills Community v. State of Michigan, (PDF), Mich. App., 626
N.W. 2d. 169, Land that, despite having been reserved for
Indian tribe, was conveyed in fee by United States to non-Indian before
Congress ratified treaty and before such land could be withdrawn,
was intended to be alienable and, therefore, taxable, and thus county's
sale of such land for nonpayment of taxes, even after its return to
trust status for use and benefit of two bands of Indians, was not
wrongful; Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, 25
U.S.C. § 177, which provides that no conveyance of tribal
land is valid unless made by treaty, applies only to voluntary conveyance
by tribe, not to involuntary conveyance by state for nonpayment of
taxes once United States has removed restraint on alienation of land
by patenting it in fee simple; due process and equal protection claims
for damages against state and governor in his official capacity, which
were essentially 42
U.S.C. § 1983 causes of action, were properly dismissed because
Section 1983 action for damages for alleged federal constitutional
violations may not be brought in state courts against state or state
official sued in official capacity.
Jefferson v. Minnesota Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Docket No.
01-1037
Subjects:
Gaming - Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) (25
USC 2701 et seq.); Taxation - State; Civil Rights - Equal Protection;
Tribal Sovereignty and Powers
*Issues:
(1) Does Minnesota have right to tax IGRA-derived per capita distributions
made solely to tribal members if these distributions come exclusively
from tribally owned and reservation-located businesses? (2) Does IGRA
preempt any attempt by Minnesota to tax gambling proceeds distributed
per capita to individual tribal members? (3) Does position that enrolled
Indians who reside on their tribal reservation cannot be taxed by
Minnesota while Indians who reside off their own reservation may be
taxed on their identically derived income violate equal protection
clause of US Constitution and implied equal protection provisions
of Minnesota Constitution? (4) Given fact that petitioners were driven
off their father's land assignment and could not return to another
residence within boundaries of their tribal reservation, should Minnesota
Tax Court have determined that petitioners had not freely chosen to
reside in Minnesota but were forced to reside in Minnesota rather
than on their tribal reservation land? (5) Does state taxation of
per capita distributions from gaming interfere with tribal self-government
and violate US Supreme Court jurisprudence?
History:
Petition for certiorari filed on 10/30/01. Certiorari denied 3/18/02.
Current
US Supreme Court docket information
*Holding
below:
Jefferson v. Commissioner of Revenue, Minn., 631
NW 2d. 391. Minnesota's taxation of per capita payments
derived from reservation gaming operations by enrolled members of
Indian tribe who reside off their tribe's reservation but within Minnesota
is not preempted by Indian Gaming Regulatory Act; neither US Constitution's
equal protection clause nor parallel provision of Minnesota Constitution
is violated when state imposes income tax on tribal members who reside
off reservation but not on tribal members residing on reservation;
nor does such tax scheme infringe on tribal self-government.
Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, Docket 01-900
Subject: Tribal Sovereignty and Powers - Environmental
Regulation - Nonmember Indians
*
Issues: (1) When delegating regulatory jurisdiction over nonmember-owned
fee simple property to Indian tribe, must Congress describe that
delegation in express and unambiguous language that refers to
nonmember-owned fee simple property? (2) Does Congress have authority
to delegate regulatory jurisdiction over fee simple property belonging
to nonmember to Hoopa Valley Tribe?
History: Petition for certiorari filed 12/10/01. Review denied
3/18/02. Current
US Supreme Court docket information
*Holding
Below: Roberta
Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, (PDF) 9th Cir., 266
F.3d 1201. Congress, acting within its authority under
Indian commerce clause, expressly and unambiguously delegated
to Hoopa Valley Tribe authority to regulate logging by nonmember
of tribe on fee land that she owns within borders of tribe's reservation
when it enacted 1988 Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act, which "ratified
and confirmed" Hoopa Valley Tribe's governing documents, including
provision of tribal constitution extending tribal jurisdiction
"to all lands" within reservation.
Idaho State Tax Commission v. Goodman Oil Company,Docket
01-794
Subject:
Taxation - Fuel; Taxation - State
*Issue: Does Section 10 of Hayden-Cartwright Act, 4
U.S.C. 104, provide congressional authorization for states to
impose their motor fuel taxes on Indian tribes or their members within
Indian reservation?
History:
Petition for certiorari filed 10/22/01. Review denied 2/19/02.
*Holding
Below: Goodman
Oil Company of Lewiston v. Idaho State Commission, (PDF), Idaho,
28
P. 2d 996.The
Supreme Court of Idaho held that (1) Hayden-Cartwright Act did not
provide congressional authorization for state to impose fuel tax on
sale of fuel to Indians on Indian reservations within state, and (2)
Idaho fuel tax and transfer fee statutes imposed legal incident of
tax on retailer rather than on distributor.
Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana Inc. v. Norton, Docket
01-776
Subject:
Tribes - Federal Recognition of
*Issues:
(1) Does DOI have authority to review status of Indian tribe
formally recognized and never terminated by Congress, in absence
of abandonment of tribal relations? (2) Is any deference due to
DOI's interpretation of its acknowledgment regulations, 25 C.F.R.
Part 83 (1982), as incorporating tribal abandonment standard for
tribes formally recognized and never terminated by Congress?
History:
Petition for certiorari filed 11/30/01. Review denied 2/19/02.
*Holding
Below: Miami
Nation of Indians of Indiana, Inc. v. US Department of the Interior,
7th Cir., 255
F.3d 342. District court decision upholding Department
of Interior's ruling that Miami Nation of Indians lacked geographic
and political identity required to qualify for recognition as tribe
entitled to federal benefits is affirmed, because by time DOI made
its determination, Miami Nation had ceased to be tribe in any reasonable
sense, given its lack of structure, territory, and significant governance;
DOI, if it erred at all, committed only harmless error in assessing
tribal status under principles set out in recognition regulation,
rather than in applying principles of voluntary abandonment of tribal
status, in view of fact that recognition regulation covers abandonment
as well as recognition.
Penobscot Nation v. Georgia-Pacific, Docket 01-723
Subject:
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - Maine
*Issues:
Did this court's equitable rule of vacatur require First Circuit to
vacate district court rulings when circuit had concluded, under principles
of res judicata, that Maine Supreme Judicial Court had, by winning
race to judgment, rendered petitioners' federal case superfluous and
thereby made it unnecessary for circuit to address decisions petitioners
sought to have reviewed on appeal?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed 11/23/01. Review denied 2/19/02.
*Holding
Below: Penobscot
Nation v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 1st Cir., 254
F.3d 317. Ruling by Maine Supreme Judicial Court that,
in dispute between state and Indian tribes concerning regulation of
waste water discharge under Clean Water Act, tribes must produce,
under Maine Access Act, correspondence between tribes and federal
agencies concerning waste water issue, but not documents reflecting
internal deliberations about such issue, precludes, on res judicata
grounds, relief sought by tribes in federal court suit, making such
action superfluous, and, accordingly, federal district court judgment
dismissing federal case for lack of jurisdiction is affirmed.
Michael
L. Enas v. United States, Docket No. 01-6553
Subjects:
Double Jeopardy; Tribal Courts - Authority; Tribal Courts - Jurisdiction;
Federal Courts Jurisdiction
History:
Petition for certiorari filed 9/25/01. Review denied 1/22/02.
*Holding Below: United
States v. Enas, (in PDF
format) 9th Cir., 255
F. 3d 662. The Court of Appeals held: (1) when an Indian
tribe exercises inherent power, the dual sovereignty exception to
double jeopardy permits federal and tribal prosecutions for the same
crime; (2) under the 1990 amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act
(ICRA), Indian tribe had inherent power to prosecute a nonmember Indian
for crime committed on tribe's reservation, so that a federal prosecution
for the same crime did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause; and
(3) despite decision of the Supreme Court in Duro that Indian tribes
did not have inherent power to prosecute nonmember Indians, Congress
had the power to determine that tribes did have such inherent power;
overruling Means
v. Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court.
Hansard
v. Redding Rancheria, Docket No. 01-707
Subject:
Sovereign Immunity - Tribal
*Issues: Does Indian tribe enjoy sovereign immunity for tort
committed by tribe while tribe is outside of Indian country?
History:
Petition for certiorari filed 9/10/01. Review denied 1/22/02.
*Holding
Below: Redding
Rancheria v. Shasta County Superior Court, (PDF)Cal Ct. App.
88
Cal. App. 4th. 384 Indian tribe and its casino, located
within reservation, are immune from ordinary tort suit, arising
outside of reservation, based on conduct of casino employees.
Wyandotte Nation v. Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri, Docket No.
01-445
Subject:
Gaming - Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) (25
USC 2701 et seq.)
*Issues: (1) Should federal court of appeals make determination
of what lands constitute "reservation" for purposes of IGRA? (2) Does
Tenth Circuit determination that tract of land in Kansas City, Kansas,
is not reservation of Wyandotte Nation conflict with 150 years of
established law, and is it inconsistent with prior decisions of this
court?
History:
Petition for certiorari filed 9/12/01. Review Denied 1/07/02.
*Holding
Below: Sac
and Fox Nation of Missouri v. Norton, 10th Cir., 240
F.3d 1250. Secretary of interior lacks authority to interpret
term the term "reservation" in Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.
New York Association of Convenience Stores v. Roth, Docket
No. 01-560
Subjects:
Taxation - Cigarettes; Taxation - Sales
*Issue: Must laws or policies that single
out Native Americans for special treatment be rationally related
to "Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians" to satisfy requirements
of 14th Amendment's equal protection clause?
History: Petition for certiorari filed 10/01/01, Review denied
12/03/01
*Holding Below: New
York Association of Convenience Stores v. Urbach, N.Y. App.
Div., 712 N.Y.S.2d 220,
275 A.D.2d 520. Judgment dismissing convenience store
association's application to compel state tax department to enforce
sales and excise taxes pertaining to on-reservation sales of tobacco
products and motor fuel by Indian retailers to non-Indian customers
is affirmed, court having concluded that record indicates rational
basis for state's differential treatment of tribes through indefinite
forbearance in enforcing such tax collection, in view of facts that
applicable tax statutes cannot effectively be enforced without cooperation
of Indian tribes, state auditors cannot go on reservations to examine
retailers' records, tribal immunity precludes suits against retailers
for failing to collect taxes, and prior efforts to enforce statutes
by intercepting tobacco and motor fuel shipments and seizing them
not only produced civil unrest and personal injuries, but also were
found to violate state tax law.
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Puyallup Indian Tribe, Docket No. 01-14
Subjects:
Hunting, Fishing, Trapping and Gathering Rights - Treaties; Subsistence
Rights - Treaties
*Issue:
Did Ninth Circuit violate principles of res judicata when it radically
narrowed geographic area of Muckleshoot Indian Tribe's treaty-based
right to fish, as that right was determined in 1974 final judgment,
which was affirmed on appeal and on which tribe has relied for 27
years?
History: Petition for certiorari filed 7/3/01. Review denied
10/09/01.
*Holding Below: United
States v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 9th Cir., 235
F.3d 429. Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's
decision in favor of the Puyallup, Suquamish, and Swinomish Tribes,
holding that the Muckleshoot Tribe's saltwater usual and accustomed
fishing area, as determined by the 1974 decision in United
States v. Washington, did not include any areas outside Elliott
Bay.
Penobscot Nation v. Greater Northern Paper Inc., Docket
No. 01-381
Subject:
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - Maine
*Issues:
(1) Are terms and conditions under which non-Indian public, including
corporations that have long been hostile to petitioner tribes, can
gain and enforce entry into tribes' reservations to demand, inspect,
and copy tribal records "internal tribal matters" reserved, under
federal law, to tribes' exclusive control and immune from state jurisdiction?
(2) Did Maine Supreme Judicial Court err in deciding, in conflict
with decisions of First Circuit, not to measure petitioner tribes'
right to be free from state control over non-Indian public's intrusion
into reservations to demand, inspect, and copy tribal records in accordance
with federal common law principles of inherent tribal sovereignty?
History:
Petition for certiorari denied 11/13/01.
Holding Below: Penobscot
Nation v. Great Northern Paper Inc. Me., 770
A.2.d 574. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine ruled that
the Maine Freedom of Access Act, (1 M.R.S.A. Sec. 401-410), which
is ordinarily applicable to municipalities and other components of
state government, is not applicable to the Tribes when they act in
their municipal capacities with respect to intertribal matters or
when they interact with other governments or agencies in their municipal
capacities.
Back
to Top
|
