| (Cite
as: 566 N.W.2d 446, 1997 SD 86)
Supreme
Court of South Dakota.
The
PEOPLE of the State of South Dakota in the Interest
of B.S. a/k/a B.A.M.,
Child(ren),
and Concerning L.S. and F.M.
No.
19630.
Considered on Briefs Jan.
9, 1997.
Decided
July 16, 1997.
*447
Anthony E. Crawford, Rapid City, for appellant, F.M., Father.
Mark W. Barnett, Attorney
General, Joan P. Baker, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, for appellee
State of South Dakota.
PER CURIAM.
**1
F.M. (father) appeals the termination of his parental rights over B.A.S.,
his two and one-half year old son. We affirm in part, reverse in part
and remand.
FACTS
**2
Father is a thirty-seven-year-old Native American male with a ninth grade
education. L.S., (mother) is a twenty-seven-year-old Native American female
with a tenth grade education.
[FN1] Father and mother have never been
married.
FN1.
Because of the child's Native American heritage, he is covered by the
provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). People
in Interest of A.R.P.,
519 N.W.2d 56, 60 (S.D.1994). However, it would appear all tribal notification
requirements of the Act were complied with in this case and no issue over
lack of compliance with any requirement of the Act has been raised in
this appeal.
**3
Mother was raised in an abusive and neglectful family environment and
began a long course of substance abuse at age ten. She began "huffing"
inhalants such as rubber cement and spray paint and, later, graduated
to alcohol, amphetamines and cocaine. She received substance abuse treatment
as an adolescent and, by age fifteen, became pregnant with her first child.
The child was adopted when it was only a month old.
**4
Mother met father while they were both patients at the Human Services
Center in 1986. Father was hospitalized for auditory and visual hallucinations
resulting from a combination of substance abuse and psychological problems.
Father's long history of substance abuse includes both alcohol and marijuana.
His psychological problems are aggravated by his substance abuse and he
has been hospitalized at the Human Services Center on five
occasions over the years. It appears father's problems largely result
from an established pattern of discontinuing his medications, continuing
his substance abuse and then becoming psychotic.
**5
Before meeting mother, father had a daughter from another relationship
who, apparently, resides with her mother but visits father on occasion.
Mother and father's first child was born in 1992, but resides with mother's
aunt. It is unclear whether mother and father's parental rights over this
child have ever been terminated.
**6
Mother and father have an established history of domestic violence. They
quarrel over matters such as father's substance abuse and become physically
violent to the extent of giving each other "black eyes." Both
mother and father have been taken to jail over night because of incidents
of domestic violence. The parties have also separated on various occasions
only to return to their cohabitation.
**7
B.A.S. was born to this couple on June 8, 1994. The baby was stable at
birth, but, developed jaundice and was required to remain at the hospital
after mother's release. After the birth, mother only infrequently requested
that the child be brought to her room and, after her release, mother and
father *448
made few visits to see the child. This behavior eventually caused medical
personnel to become concerned over a lack of bonding with the child and
a referral was made to the state Department of Social Services (DSS).
**8
A DSS investigator visited mother and father's home. While it was clean,
mother and father had made no preparations whatsoever for the arrival
of a newborn infant. Mother and father both informed the investigator
that they were schizophrenic and taking various medications. A subsequent
contact with mother's sister revealed the history of domestic violence
in the home, father's controlling influence over mother and the difficulties
mother and father experienced with their previous child and their lack
of bonding with that child. In the sister's view, neither mother nor father
were capable of caring for a child.
**9
In the meantime, DSS was advised by the child's doctor that the child
had fused sutures on the top of his head and would be needing surgery.
Thus, on June 16, the child was placed in the protective custody of DSS
and, eventually, the surgery was successfully completed. DSS filed an
abuse and neglect petition on July 19, 1994. After adjudicatory and dispositional
hearings and requests for open adoption
[FN2] by mother and father, the trial court entered findings of fact,
conclusions of law and orders terminating mother and father's parental
rights, holding mother's motion for open adoption in abeyance and denying
father's motion for an open adoption. However, the trial court's order
on the open adoption issue did contain the following provisos:
FN2.
"Open adoption" can be defined as, " 'a right to continued
contact with Child after he is adopted' or in other words, post-adoption
visitation." People
in Interest of S.A.H.,
537 N.W.2d 1, 6 (S.D.1995).
ORDERED, that all counsel
in this matter may, in thirty days, submit to the Court for its review,
proposed letters to be given to prospective adoptive parents of the minor
child; and it is further
ORDERED,
that the Department of Social Services shall notify this Court when individuals
are identified who have expressed a serious interest in adopting the minor
child so that the Court may then provide these individuals with any and
all information deemed necessary to assist them in either agreeing to
or declining an "open adoption" situation in this matter.
Father appeals.
ISSUE 1
**10
Is the evidence
sufficient to sustain the trial court's finding that termination of father's
parental rights is the least restrictive alternative?
**11
Father contends there was not proof beyond a reasonable doubt that termination
of his parental rights was the least restrictive alternative because a
less restrictive alternative existed in placing the child with him subject
to on-going monitoring by DSS.
[C]hild
custody proceedings involving the termination of parental rights to an
Indian child are subject to specific minimum federal procedures and standards.
The ICWA provides:
No
termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in the
absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result
in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.
25
U.S.C. § 1912(f). Thus, the burden of proof that must be shown is
"evidence beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
The ICWA additionally requires the State to show that it made efforts
to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. In this regard, the ICWA
provides:
Any
party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of
parental rights to, an Indian child under state law shall satisfy the
court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services
and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian
family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.
*449
25 U.S.C. § 1912(d).
A.R.P.,
519 N.W.2d at 60 (citations omitted).
**12
With regard to these requirements, the trial court entered the following
pertinent findings:
The
Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the Respondent father presents
the
following risk factors which will likely interfere with his parenting
effectively: he has failed to establish a relationship with the minor
child; his relationship with the Respondent mother is highly unstable
and oftentimes has resulted in domestic violence; he continues to refuse
treatment for his chemical dependency; he is intellectually low functioning
and presents a lack of impulse control and good judgment; he has a lack
of understanding of basic parenting skills; and he continues to drink
and use illegal drugs.
XII.
The
Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that both parents suffer from mental
illness which is but one contributing factor in their inability to perform
essential parenting duties.
XIII.
The
Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the Respondent parents are
unable to care for the minor child on a long-term basis and have failed
to show any commitment in working toward this goal.
XIV.
The
Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that serious physical or emotional
damage would likely result if the minor child was placed with either of
the Respondent parents.
XV.
The
Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the Department of Social Services
has made reasonable efforts to return legal and physical custody of the
minor child to the Respondent parents; however, these efforts have been
unsuccessful due to a lack of commitment on the part of the Respondent
parents.
XVI.
The
Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the Department of Social Services
has made active efforts to provide remedial services and rehabilitative
programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family.
**13
These findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. A.R.P.,
supra. They
are amply supported by the record. Between the time the child was taken
into DSS custody in the summer of 1994 and October 1995 (almost a year
and a half), DSS arranged some sixty-nine opportunities for mother and
father to visit the child. Father attended only twenty-two of these visitations.
A parenting instructor also attempted to work with mother and father for
almost a year, scheduling half-hour parenting classes on a near-weekly
basis. In a year's time, however, mother and father attended only twelve
or thirteen parenting classes. By June 1995, the parenting instructor
closed her involvement with the case because mother and father had not
attended classes for several weeks.
**14
Despite father's protestations to the contrary, by the time the parenting
classes ceased, neither he nor mother possessed basic parenting skills
sufficient to care for the child in the absence of supervision. Neither
parent
could consistently prepare baby formula nor could they recognize if the
child needed to be fed or when he was full. In one instance, father's
solution to the child's hunger was to give him a bottle of water. In another
incident, father played with the child and woke him up when he had specifically
been instructed that the child needed to sleep. After the child had again
fallen asleep, father woke him and changed his clothes for no apparent
reason.
**15
Father also entered into a family service agreement requiring him to undergo
chemical dependency and psychological evaluations. When these evaluations
resulted in recommendations that father complete inpatient alcohol treatment,
father adamantly *450
refused. In short, neither mother nor father did anything in a year's
time reflecting a commitment to regaining custody of their child. Compounding
mother and father's problems is the fact that the child is a special needs
child who is delayed in certain motor skills.
**16
With specific regard to the requirements of the ICWA, an ICWA expert testified
that, in her opinion, the child would suffer serious emotional or physical
injury if returned to his parents' custody. This opinion was partially
based on risk factors concerning father such as his failure to establish
and maintain a relationship with the child, the instability of father's
relationship with mother, the violence in the home, father's chemical
dependency issues, and his deficient judgment and impulse control. The
ICWA expert
also pointed to father's lack of understanding of parenting skills and
his difficulty in following or receiving directions from others. Based
upon these deficiencies, the ICWA expert testified that the least restrictive
alternative available in the disposition of the child was the termination
of both mother and father's parental rights and the adoption of the child.
**17
The foregoing evidence overwhelmingly supports the trial court's findings
as to the least restrictive alternative. Therefore, there is no clear
error in the trial court's finding concerning the termination of father's
parental rights as the least restrictive alternative commensurate with
the best interests and welfare of the child.
ISSUE 2
**18
Did the trial
court err in terminating father's parental rights because there was a
less restrictive alternative in terminating parental rights with open
adoption privileges granted to father?
**19
Father's argument under this issue relies upon this Court's decision in
S.A.H., supra
allowing the open adoption of children who have been adjudicated as abused
or neglected.
[FN3] Father submits this decision requires courts in abuse or neglect
cases to explore open adoption as a less restrictive alternative to a
full termination of parental rights. As state submits, however, this argument
is resolved by the fact that adoption presupposes
the termination of parental rights. See,
SDCL 25-6-17 (natural parents
of adopted child have no rights over child); SDCL 26-8A-27 (on entry of
dispositional decree terminating parental rights, the court shall vest
DSS with custody and guardianship of child for purpose of placing child
for adoption). Or, stated another way, parental rights over a child must
be terminated before an adoption of the child can ensue. Id.
See also, e.g., E.H. v. M.H.,
512 N.W.2d 148 (S.D.1994); Matter
of M.A.C.,
512 N.W.2d 152 (S.D.1994). It follows that adoption (whether open or closed)
cannot serve as an alternative to a termination of parental rights because
it can only follow a termination of parental rights.
FN3.
This Court's decision in S.A.H.,
supra, noted
that our statutes did not specifically prohibit open adoptions in South
Dakota. However, as of July 1, 1997, two different acts passed by the
1997 Legislature prospectively disallow open adoptions. See
1997 S.D.Sess.L. ch. 153, § 1; 1997 S.D.Sess.L. ch. 161, § 1.
**20
In this instance, as discussed under the first issue, the involuntary
termination of father's parental rights was well-supported by the record
and evidence and must be affirmed. Open adoption of the child could offer
no less restrictive alternative to the termination and, as in S.A.H.,
the decision on open adoption must be separately reviewed.
ISSUE
3
**21
Did the trial
court err in failing to enter a final judgment or order on father's motion
for open adoption after the dispositional hearing?
**22
At various stages of the dispositional phase, father's counsel attempted
to raise the issue of open adoption. These attempts were repeatedly rebuffed
by the trial court as premature because it had not yet made any decision
as to whether or not to terminate parental rights. Once an order was entered
terminating parental rights, father filed formal motions for an open adoption
and for the appointment of an expert to evaluate the desirability of open
adoption.
*451
**23
A hearing was held on father's open adoption motions during which the
trial court summarily denied the request for appointment of an expert.
The court expressed its belief that any motion for open adoption was premature
until potential adoptive parents could be located. However, the court
did decide it would be willing to provide information on mother and father
and their request for open adoption to potential adoptive parents and,
in essence, leave the determination of open adoption in the potential
parents' hands. It was for that reason that the trial court's order on
the open adoption issue denied father's motion while permitting counsel
to draft proposed letters to prospective adoptive parents and to provide
those individuals with any and all information necessary to assist "them"
in agreeing or
declining an open adoption.
**24
Father essentially contends that the trial court's method of resolving
the open adoption issue did not comport with this Court's decision in
S.A.H.
Father's argument holds merit. Just as in this case, the parents in S.A.H.
moved for an open adoption after the trial court terminated their parental
rights. S.A.H.,
537 N.W.2d at 6. The trial court denied the motion and the parents appealed
in conjunction with the appeal of the termination. In its review, this
Court recognized the concept of open adoption and outlined the following
procedural guidelines. First, that the trial court has discretion to order
open adoption and its determination is reviewed under the abuse of discretion
standard. S.A.H.,
537 N.W.2d at 6. Second, the best interest of the child is the guiding
force behind the determination. Id.
Third, in order to grant an open adoption, the court must find by clear
and convincing evidence that the child's best interests are served by
open adoption. Id.
at 7. In making this determination, the trial court must weigh:
1)
the psychological need of the child to know his ancestral, religious,
ethnic and cultural background; 2) the effect open adoption will have
on the child's integration with his adoptive family; and 3) the effect
open adoption will have on the pool of prospective adoptive parents.
Id.
Fourth, if a trial court mandates open adoption, a guardian ad litem should
be appointed to enforce the visitation order. Id.
Fifth, the trial court
may reconsider an open adoption at any time the child's best interests
are jeopardized. Id.
**25
In this case, in contrast with S.A.H.,
the record does not reflect that the trial court carefully considered
arguments for and against open adoption. There are no findings of fact
or conclusions of law in this regard. Such findings and a final determination
should have been made at or near the time parental rights were terminated.
Rather, the trial court repeatedly found arguments over the issue of open
adoption premature because potential adoptive parents had not yet been
found. Under the above procedures outlined in S.A.H.,
however, it is clear this is not required.
**26
The record reflects that the trial court's primary concern with open adoption
in this case was with whether potential adoptive parents would accept
or reject an open adoption. In S.A.H.
this Court specifically stated that, "[a]lthough the interests of
adoptive parents should be considered, parental rights are secondary to
the interests of the child." S.A.H.,
537 N.W.2d
at 6. Clearly, the trial court's determination in this case leaving the
question of open adoption in the hands of potential adoptive parents runs
afoul of this charge. Only when a prospective adoptive placement is close
at hand at the time of termination may consent be a useful factor. Moreover,
placing this child's adoptive placement in suspense, disregards both federal
and state laws mandating permanency planning for abused and neglected
children.
See e.g.
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1994)(states to provide procedures assuring
each child in foster care under supervision of state has dispositional
hearing to determine child's future status no later than eighteen months
after original placement). Accord
45 CFR § 1356.21(e). See
also ARSD 67:14:31:59
(foster child in custody of department of social services must have dispositional
hearing within 18 months from date of original foster care placement).
**27
We remand this case to the trial court to take evidence on the request
for *452
open adoption and to enter forthwith a final determination on the issue.
The court should consider: "1) the psychological need of the child
to know his ancestral, religious, ethnic and cultural background; 2) the
effect open adoption will have on the child's integration with his adoptive
family; and 3) the effect open adoption will have on the pool of prospective
adoptive parents." S.A.H.,
537 N.W.2d at 7. As always, the best interests of the child should be
the foremost consideration, with a view to providing a safe, caring and
permanent home. The trial court should enter findings of fact and conclusions
of law on these factors supportive of its ultimate determination of the
open adoption issue.
**28
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
**29
MILLER, C.J., and SABERS, AMUNDSON, KONENKAMP and GILBERTSON,
JJ., participating.
566 N.W.2d 446, 1997
SD 86
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