(Cite
as: 233 Mich.App. 438, 592 N.W.2d 751)
Court
of Appeals of Michigan.
In
the Matter of IEM, a Minor.
Docket
No. 208851.
Submitted Dec. 2, 1998, at Lansing.
Decided
Jan. 19, 1999, at 9:10 a.m.
Released
for Publication March 23, 1999.
**753
*440
Robert J. Engel, Pros. Atty., and Jennifer Herschelman, Asst. Pros. Atty.,
for the petitioner.
Robert J. Butts, Cheboygan, for
the respondent.
Before: GAGE, P.J., and
MacKENZIE and WHITE, JJ.
**754
GAGE, P.J.
Respondent T.Y.M., a minor, appeals
as of right the probate court order terminating her parental rights to
her minor child, I.E.M., pursuant to M.C.L. § 712A.19b(3)(g);
MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g).
[FN1] Although we conclude that the probate court did not err in
its findings of fact or by ordering termination of respondent's parental
rights, we must conditionally affirm
and remand this case so that the court may provide notice of these proceedings
to any interested Indian tribe, as required by the Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA), 25 USC 1901 et
seq.
FN1.
An August 29, 1997, order was entered recognizing the release by the father,
Charles Jeffrey Grimm, of his parental rights regarding Isabell. The
father is not a party to this appeal.
*441
Respondent is a cognitively and emotionally impaired, seventeen-year-old
single mother. The original petition filed by petitioner Family
Independence Agency (FIA) sought jurisdiction over both respondent and
I.E.M., alleging that the home life provided by respondent's mother Beverly
was generally chaotic, that respondent feared her younger autistic sister
J.M. might assault her, and that Beverly had ignored repeated caseworker
warnings regarding "the risk of sexual activity to the girls in [respondent's]
situation," thus resulting in respondent's pregnancy with I.E.M.
The FIA alleged concern regarding I.E.M.'s welfare because of respondent's
cognitive and emotional disorders and her resultant poor decision-making
ability, respondent's lack of parenting skills, and an alleged risk of
harm arising from J.M.'s unpredictable behavior. The FIA requested
removal of both respondent and I.E.M. from Beverly's home and recommended
their placement together in foster
care. At the April 29, 1997, preliminary hearing, the parties
agreed to a temporary out-of-home placement for respondent and I.E.M.
and to adjourn the hearing.
The FIA subsequently filed a
June 10, 1997, amended petition that withdrew its prior neglect petition
regarding respondent. Respondent therefore returned home with
Beverly in early June. On the amended petition, the FIA checked a box
that indicated I.E.M. was a "[m]ember of or eligible for membership
in American Indian Tribe or Band," but the petition contained no
further information regarding either respondent's or I.E.M.'s potential
Indian heritage. The lengthy amended petition also contained
further allegations regarding the potential for harm to I.E.M. while in
respondent's care. Specifically, the amended *442
petition alleged that, despite the provision of parenting support and
services to her, respondent had not enhanced her parenting skills, that
the attachment and bonding between respondent and I.E.M. was decreasing,
and that respondent refused to acknowledge her shortcomings as a parent
and her need for constant supervision and support. The amended
petition also contained a community mental health counselor's evaluation
of respondent as suffering from an "[a]djustment [d]isorder with
mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct" and a schizotypal personality
disorder, and described psychotic behavior exhibited by respondent, including
hallucinations and paranoia. At the June 11, 1997, preliminary
hearing regarding the amended petition, respondent's
counsel consented to an out-of-home placement for I.E.M.
After a three-day trial, a jury
concluded that the probate court had jurisdiction over I.E.M.. After a
subsequent two-day termination hearing, the probate court concluded that
clear and convincing evidence existed that termination of respondent's
parental rights was appropriate under M.C.L. § 712A.19b(3)(g);
MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g).
Respondent
first contends that the probate court may not have properly had jurisdiction
over this case and that the court's order of termination may therefore
be invalid because the court failed to ascertain whether I.E.M. was eligible
for membership in an Indian tribe and failed to notify the applicable
tribe of the instant proceedings as required by 25 USC 1912(a). Section
1914 of the ICWA confers on "any parent ... from whose custody [any
Indian child who is the subject of any action for termination of parental
rights under state law] was removed" the right to *443
"petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such
action upon a **755
showing that such action violated any provision of sections 1911, 1912,
and 1913 of this title." See also In
re Kreft, 148 Mich.App.
682, 687-689, 384 N.W.2d 843 (1986) (concluding mother whose parental
rights were terminated by Michigan court had standing pursuant to 25 USC
1914 to challenge on appeal alleged violations of ICWA, even without tribe's
participation in appeal). Whether the probate court failed
to satisfy a notice obligation imposed by the ICWA involves
a legal question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. Yaldo
v. North Pointe Ins. Co.,
457 Mich. 341, 344, 578 N.W.2d 274 (1998).
Pursuant
to the ICWA, child custody proceedings involving foster care placement
or termination of parental rights to an Indian child are subject to specific
federal procedures and standards. In
re Elliott, 218 Mich.App.
196, 201, 554 N.W.2d 32 (1996). "[T]o promote the stability
and security of Indian tribes and families," Congress established
within the ICWA "minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian
children from their families and the placement of such children in foster
or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture...."
25 USC 1902. One of the requirements imposed by the
ICWA is that an interested Indian tribe receive notice of termination
proceedings involving Indian children:
In
any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or
has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking
the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an
Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian
child's tribe, by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the
*444
pending proceedings and of their right of intervention. If
the identity or location of the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe
cannot be determined, such notice shall be given to the Secretary [of
the Interior] in like manner, who shall have fifteen days after receipt
to provide the requisite notice to the parent
or Indian custodian and the tribe. [25 USC 1912(a).]
See also MCR 5.980(A)(2) (requiring that a court presiding over
a protective proceeding involving an Indian child notify "the child's
tribe and the child's parents or Indian custodian and, if the tribe is
unknown, ... the Secretary of the Interior" of the proceeding). For
ICWA purposes, an "Indian child" is any unmarried individual
less than eighteen years of age who is either (1) an Indian tribe member
or (2) both eligible for Indian tribe membership and an Indian tribe member's
biological child. 25 USC 1903(4).
The FIA argues that the tribal
notice requirement was inapplicable in the instant case because it was
not established before the probate court that I.E.M. was an Indian child
as defined by the ICWA. At the April 29, 1997, preliminary hearing, pursuant
to MCR 5.965(B)(7), the referee inquired whether respondent was an Indian
tribe member or was eligible for Indian tribe membership, to which Beverly
replied, "[S]he has a little [I]ndian in her, but I don't know if
it's enough to qualify." Subsequently, at the June 11,
1997, preliminary hearing regarding the FIA's amended petition, respondent
answered affirmatively when the referee asked whether respondent had any
Indian blood. Beverly elaborated that respondent's father's family had
some Indian blood, but that she did not know whether respondent qualified
for membership in any *445
Indian tribe. The referee noted for the record that respondent
was potentially an Indian tribe member and ordered that the FIA further
investigate respondent's
eligibility for tribal membership.
The
FIA claims that I.E.M. is not eligible for Indian tribe membership as
the biological child of a member because respondent failed to enroll or
otherwise supply some form of membership verification from any Indian
tribe. However, the FIA's argument ignores that tribal membership is not
defined by enrollment.
Enrollment
is not always required in order to be a member of a tribe. Some
tribes do not have written rolls. Others have rolls that list
only persons that were members as of a certain date. Enrollment
is the common evidentiary means of establishing Indian status, but it
is not the only means nor is it necessarily determinative. **756
[Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings,
44 Fed Reg 67584, 67586 (1979),
[FN2] citing United
States v. Broncheau,
597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (C.A.9, 1979).]
FN2.
The guidelines were "not intended to have binding legislative effect."
44 Fed. Reg., supra,
p. 67584. However, we find them persuasive and note that "[t]he
courts that have considered notice issues have, however, followed the
recommended procedures." In
re M.C.P., 153 Vt.
275, 286, 571 A.2d 627 (1989).
See also People
ex rel. South Dakota Dep't of Social Services, In re C.H.,
510
N.W.2d 119, 123 (S.D., 1993); In
re H.D., 11 Kan.App.2d
531, 535-536, 729 P.2d 1234 (1986). Because respondent's lack
of enrollment in an Indian tribe is not dispositive of whether I.E.M.
qualifies as an Indian child, we must consider whether the limited information
provided to the probate court regarding respondent's Indian heritage sufficed
to invoke the ICWA's notice requirement.
[FN3]
FN3.
In In re Shawboose,
175 Mich.App. 637, 639, 438 N.W.2d 272 (1989), this Court concluded that
the ICWA did not apply when the "respondent never met the prerequisite
of being an enrolled member of an Indian tribe." The
Shawboose
Court did not address the issue of proper notice, however, and its statement
regarding the respondent's enrollment may not be interpreted as imposing
an enrollment prerequisite to application of the ICWA in every case involving
an Indian child. The respondent's enrollment constituted a
dispositive issue in Shawboose
only because one of the potentially appropriate tribes, which had already
received notice of those proceedings and was given the opportunity to
intervene, had itself declined jurisdiction on the basis that the respondent
was not an enrolled member of the tribe. Id.
at 639-640, 438 N.W.2d 272.
*446
Although the brief testimony regarding respondent's Indian ancestry was
inconclusive regarding her tribal membership status, the information was
sufficient to require the FIA to provide notice regarding this proceeding.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs guidelines enumerate "the
most common circumstances giving rise to a reasonable belief that a child
may be an Indian." 44 Fed. Reg., supra,
p. 67586. The guidelines provide:
B.1.
Determination That Child Is an Indian
(a)
When a state court has reason to believe a child involved in a child custody
proceeding is an Indian, the court shall seek verification of the child's
status from either the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the child's tribe....
* * *
(c)
Circumstances under which a state court has reason to believe a child
involved in a child custody proceeding is an Indian include but are not
limited to the following:
(i)
Any party to the case, Indian tribe, Indian organization or public or
private agency informs the court that the child is an Indian child.
(ii)
Any public or state-licensed agency involved in child protection services
or family support has discovered information which suggests
that the child is an Indian child.
(iii)
The child who is the subject of the proceeding gives the court reason
to
believe he or she is an Indian child.
(iv)
The residence or the domicile of the child, his or her biological parents,
or the Indian custodian is known by the *447
court to be or is shown to be a predominantly Indian community.
(v)
An officer of the court involved in the proceeding has knowledge that
the child may
be an Indian child. [Id.
(emphasis added).]
See also In the
Interest of H.D., supra
at 534-536, 729 P.2d 1234. Respondent's and Beverly's testimony
certainly at least suggests that respondent, and consequently I.E.M.,
potentially qualify as tribal members, and we therefore conclude that
their testimony obligated the probate court to ensure that the FIA complied
with the ICWA's tribal notification requirement. In
re J.T., 166 Vt. 173,
181-182, 693 A.2d 283 (1997) (father's statement to psychologist that
his father was "full-blooded Mohican" sufficient to trigger
obligation of trial court to inquire regarding child's Indian status by
providing notice to tribe); In
re Pedro N., 35 Cal.App.4th
183, 186, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 819 (1995) ("The Indian status of the child
need not be certain in order to trigger notice."); In
re M.C.P., 153 Vt.
275, 288-289, 571 A.2d 627 (1989) (concluding that lower court erred in
failing to **757
require tribal notice where adoptive father was member of Mohawk Indian
Tribe who asserted that child was eligible for membership). We
agree with the Vermont Supreme Court's observation that "[t]o maintain
stability in placements of children
in juvenile proceedings, it is preferable to err on the side of giving
notice and examining thoroughly whether the juvenile is an Indian child,"
id.
at 289, 571 A.2d 627, and that "Indian tribes are in a better position
to determine the membership of individuals who have some relationship
to the tribe and the court should defer to this expertise." Id.
at 285-286, 571 A.2d 627. See also In
re Shawboose, 175 Mich.App.
637, 639, 438 N.W.2d 272 (1989) (The issue whether the *448
minor children were Indian children was one for the tribes and not for
the probate court to decide.). "It is impossible for a tribe
to determine whether a child is a tribal member or eligible for membership
if it never receives notice of the proceeding." in
rE J.T., supra at 183,
693 A.2d 283. our permitting the probate court and the FIA
to simply ignore the testimony of record implicating the ICWA notification
requirement would contravene the explicitly stated congressional objective
"to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families,"
25 USC 1902, and we decline to permit the court and the FIA to disregard
Congress' expressed intent.
Because
the probate court had reason to believe I.E.M. had some unspecified Indian
heritage, the FIA was required to send notice of the probate court proceedings
and of the applicable tribe's right of intervention through registered
mail, return receipt requested, to the Secretary of the Interior. 25 USC
1912(a); MCR 5.980(A)(2). The lower court record, however,
does not
reflect that the FIA subsequently pursued the matter. The
FIA includes in its brief on appeal a document requesting a determination
regarding I.E.M.'s possible tribal affiliation that it allegedly sent
to the Michigan Indian Child Welfare Agency, and notes that it made a
telephone call to the local Odawa Indian Tribe. These efforts
by the FIA fall far short of satisfying the ICWA's notice requirements.
First, no indication exists that the FIA sent the document
by registered mail, return receipt requested. 25 USC 1912(a). Second,
the document was not correctly addressed to the Secretary of the Interior.
[FN4] Id.
Third, *449
the document nowhere informs any potentially interested tribe of its right
of intervention. Id.
The FIA's telephone call also did not satisfy any of these ICWA requirements.
FN4.
Although the statute, 25 USC 1912(a), explains that when the child's tribe
has not been determined, notice must go to the Secretary of the Interior,
we note that the regulations implementing the statute require that for
Michigan proceedings in which the child's tribe is undetermined, notice
must be provided to the Minneapolis Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs.
25 CFR 23.11(b), (c)(2).
The
FIA incorrectly implies that respondent should have provided more initial
information regarding her Indian heritage and wrongly asserts that after
its telephone call to the local Odawa Tribe, it was then up to the tribe
to respond. It is not the responsibility of respondent to
establish the applicability of the ICWA. "Only after notice has been
provided and a tribe has failed to respond or has intervened but is unable
to determine the child's eligibility for membership does the burden shift
to the parties to show that the ICWA still applies." In
re J.T., supra at 183,
693 A.2d 283. Because we have determined that the FIA's alleged
notice to an interested tribe did not comply with the ICWA, the FIA's
argument that it was then the tribe's responsibility to take some further
action is without merit. Id.
("It is impossible for a tribe to determine whether a child is a
tribal member or eligible for membership if it never receives notice of
the proceeding.") Id.
Having
concluded that the probate court and petitioner failed to comply with
the ICWA's notice requirements, we remain faced with the question of how
this failure affects the probate court's order terminating respondent's
parental rights. Because, as discussed below, we find that
the probate court properly terminated respondent's parental rights according
to Michigan law, we conclude that we need not reverse the probate court's
order of termination. We instead *450
adopt the same approach taken by many other states' appellate courts that
have **758
addressed a lower court's failure to provide adequate notice under 25
USC 1912(a), and conditionally affirm the probate court's termination
order, but remand so that the court and the FIA may provide proper notice
to any interested tribe.
We
do not believe [reversal of the adjudication and the return of the juvenile
to the parents' custody] is warranted where the sole deficiency at this
time is in notice and there has been no determination that the ICWA otherwise
applies to this proceeding. Thus, in In
re Colnar, 52 Wash.App.
[37,] 41[;] 757 P.2d [534 (1988) ], the court remanded the matter to the
trial court to notify the appropriate tribe, and, when the tribe did not
intervene in the proceeding, affirmed the original order. The
court in In re Junious
M., 144 Cal.App.3d
[786,] 798[;] 193 Cal.Rptr. [40 (1983) ], ordered a similar remand for
notice. We concur that these cases set forth the appropriate
procedure and remand to the trial court for notice according to the [ICWA].
If the tribe does not seek to intervene, or after intervention the trial
court still concludes that the ICWA does not apply, the original orders
will stand. If the trial court does conclude that the ICWA applies,
further proceedings consistent with the Act will be necessary. [In
re M.C.P., supra at
289, 571 A.2d 627.]
See also People
ex rel. South Dakota Dep't of Social Services, supra
at 124-125 (also remanding solely for tribal notification purposes).
Next,
respondent raises several challenges to the probate court's findings and
conclusions supporting its order terminating her parental
rights. A court may order termination of a parent's rights
when clear and convincing evidence establishes that at least one statutory
ground for termination exists. MCL 712A.19b(3); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3);
MCR 5.974(F)(3). Once a *451
statutory ground for termination has been proved by clear and convincing
evidence, the respondent bears the burden of going forward with evidence
that termination is clearly not in the child's best interests. In
re Hall-Smith, 222
Mich.App. 470, 472-473, 564 N.W.2d 156 (1997). Absent any
evidence addressing this issue by the respondent, termination of parental
rights is mandatory. Id.
at 473, 564 N.W.2d 156. A decision regarding termination is reviewed
in its entirety for clear error. In
re Hamlet (After Remand),
225 Mich.App. 505, 515, 571 N.W.2d 750 (1997).
Respondent
suggests that the probate court erred in terminating her parental rights
without taking into account that Beverly, her mother, testified that she
had planned on assisting respondent in caring for I.E.M. Specifically,
respondent challenges that the "court in this case ruled that the
rights of [respondent], the mother, must be weighed independent of the
availability of this other parental assistant, in this case, the grandmother,
Beverly...." Respondent presumably refers to the following discussion
of the probate court regarding Beverly:
In
similar fashion, much was made of grandmother Beverly's independent ability
to be a fit custodian for [I.E.M.]. The argument was advanced that Beverly,
the grandmother, could adequately protect [I.E.M.] and therefore [respondent]
and [I.E.M.] should live with her. Again, while it may be
a practical reality that Beverly could adequately parent [I.E.M.], the
question for the court is whether [respondent] is, or can be, a fit custodian
on her own and, if not, whether her parental rights should be terminated.
If the court concludes that termination of rights should occur,
the fact that a grandmother is a fit custodian may be a proper consideration
for permanency planning in the context of an adoptive placement. Aside
from this future possibility, the rights of [respondent] must be weighed
independent of the danger *452
posed by sister [J.M.] as well as the surrogate parenting by the grandmother.
A thorough review of the entirety
of the probate court's opinion reveals, however, that respondent's argument
is without merit. The opinion reflects that the probate court
carefully considered the testimony of many witnesses regarding respondent's
potential to parent effectively if assisted by someone. For
example, the probate court found that several witnesses' testimony established
that to function effectively as a parent respondent would require constant
supervision. The probate court also found that several witnesses
had testified that despite the possibility of receiving parenting assistance,
because **759
of her cognitive and emotional impairments respondent would unlikely ever
improve her skills sufficiently to undertake the complex responsibilities
of parenting. The court concluded that it had found "clear
and convincing evidence that [respondent] is an intellectually and emotionally
limited teenager who, because of her significant longstanding deficits,
cannot be expected to develop the intellectual and cognitive ability to
be a safe and nurturing parent regardless
of how long or under what conditions she is assisted."
(Emphasis added.) Thus, although the court did not specifically
refer to Beverly in determining whether respondent could become a better
parent through the assistance of another, the findings and conclusions
of the probate court indicate that it determined that no amount of assistance
from anyone would enable respondent to behave in the manner of "a
safe and nurturing parent." Because our review of the
record reflects that the court's findings and conclusion were well supported,
we reject respondent's argument that the probate *453
court erred in failing to consider Beverly's assistance in determining
whether to terminate her rights.
Respondent's
argument concerning the probate court's alleged error in failing to consider
Beverly when deciding whether to terminate respondent's parental rights
continues for approximately seventeen pages, and it is unclear exactly
what further positions respondent is attempting to set forth. To
the extent respondent contends that the probate court erred in terminating
her rights without considering an arrangement involving Beverly as I.E.M.'s
primary caregiver and respondent's also living in Beverly's home, we conclude
that this position is without merit. In support of her position,
respondent
points to the philosophy statement found in M.C.L. § 712A.1(3);
MSA 27.3178(598.1)(3), which counsels that the juvenile code "shall
be liberally construed so that each juvenile coming within the jurisdiction
of the court receives the care, guidance, and control, preferably in his
or her own home, conducive to the juvenile's welfare and the best interest
of the state." Respondent also points to the similar philosophy statement
found in MCR 5.902(B). However, respondent's argument ignores
this Court's prior observation that the language of M.C.L. § 712A.1(3);
MSA 27.3178(598.1)(3)' s virtually identical predecessor provision,
M.C.L. § 712A.1(2); MSA 27.3178(598.1)(2), does not require
that the court place a child with relatives. In
re McIntyre, 192 Mich.App.
47, 52, 480 N.W.2d 293 (1991). If it is in the best interests of
the child, the probate court may properly terminate parental rights instead
of placing the child with relatives. Id.
See also In re Sterling,
162 Mich.App. 328, 342, 412 N.W.2d 284 (1987) (The court was not under
a duty to place the child with relatives.); *454
In re McCullough, 141
Mich.App. 170, 171, 366 N.W.2d 90 (1985) (rejecting mother's argument
that probate court erred in terminating her parental rights before investigating
possible placement with relatives). Despite the general policy
preference underlying the juvenile code that a child remain in its own
home, the Legislature has defined certain situations in which the negative
influences in the minor's home justify a departure from this policy preference
and require the
termination of the parents' rights. MCL 712A.19b(3); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3).
This case falls squarely within one of the legislatively defined
situations warranting a departure from the general policy of keeping the
minor in its own home, specifically subsection 19b(3)(g).
[FN5] In light of the probate court's conclusion, discussed above,
that respondent is unlikely to ever arrive at being a safe and nurturing
parent, and its further determinations that a potential for physical harm
to I.E.M. existed because of respondent's hallucinations and that I.E.M.
would likely achieve limited intellectual and emotional development if
not placed in an enriching environment, all of which observations were
amply supported in the record, we conclude that the probate court did
not err in finding that termination was warranted and was not contrary
to I.E.M.'s best interests.
FN5.
Subsection 19b(3)(g) provides for termination when "[t]he parent,
without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for
the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will
be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering
the age of the child."
Next,
respondent challenges the probate court's findings that relied on the
testimony **760
of psychologist Timothy Strauss, alleging that Strauss'
testimony *455
regarding her ability to bond with I.E.M. was improperly speculative because
he had not observed any interaction between her and I.E.M. Assuming arguendo
that the probate court erred in considering Strauss' testimony regarding
the poor potential for bonding between someone situated similarly to respondent
and a very young child, this error was harmless. Our review
of the record reveals that multiple witnesses who had observed respondent
interacting with I.E.M. testified about their concerns regarding respondent's
neglectful, hallucinatory, and paranoid behaviors. The significant
number of witnesses who observed respondent's behavior and testified about
their concerns regarding respondent's parenting abilities distinguish
the instant case from In
re Hulbert, 186 Mich.App.
600, 605, 465 N.W.2d 36 (1990), in which this Court reversed a probate
court's termination order that was based almost exclusively on the speculative
opinions of psychologists regarding what might happen in the future. Because
clear and convincing evidence besides Strauss' generalized expert testimony
established respondent's neglectful behaviors, there is no reasonable
probability that the trial court's consideration of Strauss' testimony
significantly affected the outcome of this case. In
re Hamlet, supra at
518, 571 N.W.2d 750.
Finally,
we reject respondent's contention that the probate court erred in allegedly
comparing the home that respondent and Beverly could provide with that
of a traditional family. Respondent directs our attention
to the following
statements of the probate court, made at the conclusion of the termination
hearing:
And
there's this need for the natural family, which is kind of hard to judge,
but we see it all the time, particularly here *456
in the probate court, where we have people searching desperately who have
been adopted for natural parents and that connection, and that's a real
difficult area to know. This Court believes that the natural
family is not an asset if it's not safe or if it's destructive, even though
there's emotional tug for that. If that's a dangerous circumstance
... then that's out-weighed. On the other hand, it's hard
to measure the actual growth benefit of being connected to a natural family.
It seems very important to many people and very useful.
A review of these statements convinces us that the probate court
made absolutely no attempt to compare the potential home environment of
respondent and Beverly with some abstract notion of a "traditional
family." The court merely referenced the juvenile code's
underlying policy of keeping minors with their natural families, presumably
meaning biological families, and went on to determine that in the instant
case the dangers posed to I.E.M. by respondent's lack of parenting skills
outweighed any benefit I.E.M. would derive from remaining with respondent.
Therefore, because respondent's argument mischaracterizes
the probate court's remarks, we conclude that the argument is meritless.
We conditionally affirm the order terminating respondent's parental rights,
but remand for the purpose of providing proper notice to any interested
Indian tribe pursuant to the ICWA. We do not retain jurisdiction.
233 Mich.App. 438, 592 N.W.2d
751
|