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(Cite as: 203 Mich.App. 461,
513 N.W.2d 154)
Court
of Appeals of Michigan.
Jean
Charlotte GRAY, Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
Sault
Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, Intervenor-Appellee,
v.
Robert
William PANN, Defendant-Appellant.
Docket
No. 160053.
Submitted Nov. 9, 1993, at Lansing.
Decided
Feb. 7, 1994, at 9:55 a.m.
**155
*462
Peter J. Lucido, P.C. by Peter J. Lucido, Clinton Township, for plaintiff-appellee.
Matthew R. Rumora and Thomas C. Zavela, St. Clair Shores, for defendant-appellant.
James M. Jannetta, Sault Ste.
Marie, for Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, intervenor-appellee.
Before MICHAEL J. KELLY, P.J.,
and HOOD and THOMAS [FN*],
JJ.
FN*
Terrence R. Thomas, 3rd Judicial Circuit Judge, sitting on Court of Appeals
by assignment pursuant to Const. 1963, Art. 6, Sec. 23, as amended 1968.
HOOD, Judge.
This is an action for custody
of a minor child filed by the child's maternal grandmother. Defendant
appeals as of right from the trial court's dismissal of the action. We
affirm.
Plaintiff's daughter, Bernice
Gray, disappeared on December 26, 1991. Her bloodstained car
was recovered later, but her body was never found. Although
defendant was apparently a prime suspect, he has not been charged.
Four days after the disappearance,
defendant filed a signed and notarized affidavit of parentage apparently
executed by him and Ms. Gray shortly after the
child's birth. Defendant and Ms. Gray were never married.
Ms. Gray did not name a father
in the child's original birth certificate. However, she did give
defendant's last name to the child. The birth certificate
was amended in 1992 to list defendant *463
as the father in accordance with the affidavit of parentage.
Ms. Gray's mother--plaintiff--filed
actions in the probate and circuit courts to obtain custody of the child
to defendant's exclusion. The probate court action was stayed
in favor of this circuit court custody action. Ms. Gray and
the child had been living with plaintiff at the time of the disappearance
and intermittently before that.
In early 1992, defendant filed
a motion for dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction. The
motion was denied, as were defendant's attempts to file an interlocutory
appeal. A few days later, our Supreme court decided Bowie
v. Arder, 441 Mich.
23, 490 N.W.2d 568 (1992).
About a month after the Bowie
decision, the intervenor, the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians,
enrolled plaintiff and the child as members of the tribe. Intervenor
then requested that the action be transferred to tribal court pursuant
to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et
seq. Defendant
renewed his motion for dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction.
The court held an evidentiary
hearing. It ruled that the intervenor had proved
that the child was covered by the ICWA and that, therefore, tribal courts
had exclusive jurisdiction. It denied defendant's motion to
dismiss, **156
finding that there was still a question of fact regarding whether defendant
was the child's father. It then dismissed the action without
prejudice.
Defendant
first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
because, under Bowie,
plaintiff lacked standing to commence a custody action. We
agree. See Bowie,
supra at 27, 43, 45,
490 N.W.2d 568. However, we also agree with the intervenor
that, because the trial court dismissed the action--which was the remedy
sought by defendant in both *464
his motions--he cannot now complain. Ford
Motor Co. v. Jackson (On Rehearing),
399 Mich. 213, 225-226, 249 N.W.2d 29 (1976). The fact that the trial
court reached the right result for the wrong reason is not grounds to
reverse on appeal. Templin
v. Nottawa Twp., 362
Mich. 257, 261, 106 N.W.2d 825 (1961).
Defendant
next argues that the trial court erred in allowing the tribe to intervene
and in transferring jurisdiction to the tribal court. First, we find that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the tribe to
intervene. See MCR 2.209(A)(3). Second, contrary
to defendant's assertions, we find that the trial court actually did not
transfer jurisdiction to the tribal court, although it did find that the
child was covered
by the ICWA and held that the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction.
Rather, the trial court's order states that "[i]t is
further ordered that the instant cause be dismissed." It
completely fails to mention a transfer of jurisdiction. Thus,
we need not decide that issue.
We
note that whether the ICWA applies and whether the tribal court properly
asserted jurisdiction over the child are matters to be litigated in that
tribunal.
Affirmed.
203 Mich.App. 461, 513 N.W.2d
154
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